Varying the Variance:  How New York City Can Solve Its Housing Crisis and Optimize Land Use to Serve the Public Interest by Boone, Nathan T.
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 81 | Issue 2 Article 9
2016
Varying the Variance: How New York City Can
Solve Its Housing Crisis and Optimize Land Use to
Serve the Public Interest
Nathan T. Boone
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Part of the Housing Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real
Estate Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Nathan T. Boone, Varying the Variance: How New York City Can Solve Its Housing Crisis and Optimize Land Use to Serve the Public
Interest, 81 Brook. L. Rev. (2016).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol81/iss2/9
837
Varying the Variance
HOW NEW YORK CITY CAN SOLVE ITS HOUSING
CRISIS AND OPTIMIZE LAND USE TO SERVE THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
INTRODUCTION
Eleven-year-old Dasani’s mother named her after the new
bottled water entering Brooklyn bodegas on the eve of her birth.1
The water brand, beyond the reach of Dasani’s mother’s finances,
revealed the upwardly mobile vision that Dasani’s mother had for
her.2 And yet, Dasani, who endured the misfortune of living in one
of New York’s most notoriously decrepit shelters—The Auburn
Family Residence—was also named after an urban phenomenon:
new, expensive products for new, wealthy residents.3 Ultimately,
what Dasani needed more than anything was a room away from
her large, complicated family. A room where she could not only do
her schoolwork, but where she could dream of a better life.4
Dasani’s future was threatened and continues to be threatened by
her homelessness.5
Dasani’s struggles notwithstanding, urban America is back
in vogue. Fledgling college-educated professionals are flocking to
major cities in droves, seeking career opportunities, diverse
cultural experiences, and alternative housing and transportation
options.6 Television shows like HBO’s Girls and CBS’s New Girl
glamorize the pleasures of living in a modern, urban utopia where
creative people abound, chopped salad shops proliferate, and
young, single people are always coming or going from the yoga
studio or a “bootcamp”-style workout.
1 See Andrea Elliott, Invisible Child, Part I, Girl in the Shadows: Dasani’s
Homeless Life, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/projects/2013/
invisible-child/#/?chapt=1 [http://perma.cc/88XV-7P5J].
2 Id.
3 See id.
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See Vishaan Chakrabarti, America’s Urban Future, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/americas-urban-future.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/CW49-9FVL].
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Though millennials with diverse backgrounds have
disproportionately flocked to New York City, Chicago, and San
Francisco,7 in these cities they face the same force that Dasani
has endured her whole life: a wildly unaffordable housing market.
This unaffordability has grown in recent years. New York City
residents with rent burdens (that is, renters who spend more than
30% of their income on rent) grew from 44% of renters in 2000 to
54% of renters in 2012.8 To illustrate the problem another way, in
New York City, the median monthly rent citywide rose 11% while
the median household income rose by only 2%.9 With incomes
stagnant,10 many commentators see increasing the supply of
housing and decreasing its cost as a principal means through
which governments can equalize income gains and housing cost
increases.11 Vacancy rates reached an alarming low of 3.58% in
2012, suggesting that supply is a principal constraint in the New
York real estate market.12 As seen by the surge of millennials to
New York, it has become an increasingly attractive place to live
and work due to the city’s lower crime rates and vast cultural
amenities.13 Presumably, in a free-market system, investors
seeking returns on capital would invest in real estate
commensurate with rising demand. But housing in New York is
limited by geographical and regulatory constraints.14 In particular,
there is limited land to develop because of building and zoning
restrictions, a problem compounded by the inherently limited size
of the island of Manhattan.15 A housing policy that promotes the
construction of new units and increases vacancy rates could be the
difference between personal economic catastrophe (i.e.,
homelessness) and a viable path to the middle class.
7 See Cody Fuller, For the Love of Money: Why Millennials Are Moving to
Expensive Cities, ZILLOW (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.zillow.com/research/millennials-
move-expensive-cities-8257/ [http://perma.cc/6PSJ-UAU5].
8 See NYU FURMAN CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING &
NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2013, at 32 (2013), http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC2013_
Renters.pdf [http://perma.cc/EW7U-LCWG].
9 Id.
10 See Neil Shah, Stagnant Wages Are Crimping Economic Growth, WALL ST.
J. (Aug. 25, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323980604
579028822725730720 [http://perma.cc/KC8K-FNAY].
11 See David Alpert, Finding the Middle Ground Between Affordable Housing and
Land Use Advocacy, NEXT CITY (May 10, 2012), http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/finding-the-
middle-ground-between-affordable-housing-and-land-use-advocacy [http://perma.cc/8A25-
RG47].
12 STATE OFNEWYORKCITY’SHOUSING&NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 8, at 36.
13 Catherine Rampell, Why the Rent Is So High in New York, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 26, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/why-the-rent-
is-so-high-in-new-york/ [http://perma.cc/6V9E-J5YS].
14 Id.
15 Id.
2016] VARYING THE VARIANCE 839
Urban America requires a solution to its affordable
housing crisis, and combined with the above data, Census Bureau
reports demonstrate that New York City needs a solution more
than most cities.16 The present land use paradigm—zoning—
creates neighborhoods unsullied by incompatible uses. But zoning
also limits landowners’ freedom to utilize their parcels as they see
fit. From the beginning of modern urban land use regulation, the
variance has alleviated this tension by providing a constitutional
safety valve—it creates exceptions to zoning restrictions when
economic necessity demands it. Unfortunately, New York City’s
current zoning and variance system slows affordable housing
development and empowers special interest groups who oppose
development even when the public clamors for aggressive change.
Because zoning has proved to be the best system yet for
managing the conflicting needs of urban development, and
affordable housing requires an exception to present zoning
restrictions, policymakers should consider an expansion of the
variance system. In particular, policymakers should adopt a new
version of the variance—in essence, a “public interest variance”—
through which municipalities could permit development outside
the scope of the zoning rules for a particular property when it
would serve an enumerated public interest. This would directly
increase housing affordability and indirectly support antipoverty
efforts that have been long resistant to government intervention
intended to increase the supply of housing and decrease its cost
relative to incomes. Ultimately, this note acknowledges the value
of highly regulated, modern land use rules but seeks a solution
that promotes property rights and the implementation of public
objectives (i.e., housing affordability) through an expanded
variance system.
This note explores the development of modern land use
regulations, legislative responses to constitutional qualms about
property rights through the development of the variance, and the
empowerment of special interests through the current back and
forth between zoning and the variance at the expense of the
public interest. It argues that a more flexible variance system
16 STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’SHOUSING & NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 8, at 32;
see also Population and Housing Narrative Profile 2009-2013 American Community Survey
5-Year Estimates, Geography: New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA
Metro Area, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://thedataweb.rm.census.gov/TheDataWeb_
HotReport2/profile/2013/5yr/np01.hrml?SUMLEV=310&cbsa=35620 [http://perma.cc/HQ5T-
URH9] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016) (describing a large study that many journalists and
researchers use for information on household size and housing costs).
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would retain the benefits of the zoning system while disrupting
the special interests that hurt lower-income urban dwellers.
In Part I, this note explores the origins of modern American
planning law, including the 1916 New York planning law, the
Supreme Court’s embrace of a government’s right to zone inVillage
of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., and the modern regulatory
scheme built upon New York City’s 1961 planning law. Part II
examines the current state of urban planning in New York City
and examines the present housing shortage, the community board
review process, recent rezoning efforts, and the effect of entrenched
interests on preserving neighborhood character at the expense of
the young and economically disadvantaged. It also considers
alternatives to zoning and ultimately concludes that smaller
changes within the zoning framework would most effectively
address affordability concerns without inviting urban disorder seen
in cities without zoning. Acknowledging the current, yet imperfect,
zoning system, Part III examines in detail the variance process,
through which landowners may obtain equitable relief for
“economic hardship.” Part IV then proposes a new conception of the
variance, the “public interest variance,” based in part on provisions
from telecommunications law, state court decisions, and various
“balancing tests” occasionally employed in a limited number of
jurisdictions. This note provides a statutory model that facilitates
housing development and demonstrates how the public interest
variance could be expansive in effect, but limited in scope to very
specific development goals, including housing, transportation,
sustainability, and other urban issues. In conclusion, the note
explores how such a change can come about through community
dialogue and public will and how the new system can fairly
consider the interests of those who fear development.
I. ZONING’S RISE THROUGH THE AGES AND ITSGROWING
CONFLICT WITH PROPERTY RIGHTS
Though formal regulation of land use is standard practice
today, its broad, codified form is relatively new to human
civilization. Ancient societies preferred after-the-fact solutions to
building difficulties, such as by making a failure to reinforce a
buckling wall that subsequently kills a person a capital crime.17
By the twelfth century, the writ of nuisance appeared, protecting
a plaintiff ’s easements and natural rights in land and mirroring
17 Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law:
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 348 (1995).
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modern zoning in its efforts to harmonize land use among
neighbors and communities.18 Through the centuries, the doctrine
further developed to compensate neighbors and the public when a
defendant harmed others on the defendant’s own land.19 As the
Western world experienced profound urbanization and mechanical
development during the Industrial Revolution, conflicts about land
use increased, and municipalities sought to exert more control over
the location and nature of industries and businesses.20 In the
United States, early efforts to control land use consisted of
ordinances that created limitations on otherwise legal businesses—
especially immigrant-owned businesses.21 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Barbier v. Connolly,22 upheld a San Francisco city
ordinance that made overnight operation of laundry facilities
(which were largely Chinese-owned and operated) illegal, because
the restrictions were within the municipality’s police power.23 The
Court in Barbier found that, if such an ordinance was facially
applicable to all laundry operators, then the law survived a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge.24
As the urban regulatory apparatus began to pick up
steam, businesses and social theorists alike began to reposition
the ideal of the self-contained, rural homestead into urban land
use. National groups discussed how to encourage the development
of single-family residential districts (that is, expel “apartment
homes”), and planners obsessed over serving the “desirable citizen”
who owned his own detached home.25 This policy reinforced
socioeconomic class segregation because low-income families could
generally not afford single-family homes.26 Conservative thinkers
in the first few decades of the twentieth century often objected to
residential-oriented zoning due to its abrogation of property rights
and classist implications.27 Building on the racial concerns inherent
in Barbier, some progressives were similarly critical of residential-
18 See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 192-93 (1990).
19 Id.
20 See Joel Kosman, Toward an Inclusionary Jurisprudence: A
Reconceptualization of Zoning, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 59, 64 (1993) (describing how the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors attempted to regulate and mold public laundry and wash
house operations).
21 Id.
22 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
23 Id. at 32.
24 Id. at 31.
25 Kosman, supra note 20, at 80.
26 Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper Homes?
Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate Over Zoning for Exclusively Private
Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 375-76 (1994).
27 Id. at 380-81.
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oriented zoning, citing the class and ethnic segregation that low-
density zoning would inevitably promote and the underlying
“irrational animus that upper classes bore against lower classes.”28
Ignoring these concerns, planners across the country
grew steadily more insistent on the ideal of an apartment-free
municipality. Long before the proliferation of the condominium or
co-op, urban theorists thought that, naturally, “[a] city cannot be
a city of home owners where the multiple-dwelling flourishes.”29
Put differently, economic growth and urbanization churned
aggressively towards a more restrictive and controlled urban
landscape that valued single-family home ownership over
affordable, multidwelling housing. Looking back, it appears
inevitable that changing understandings of urban life would lead
to a broad acceptance of zoning laws.
In 1916, New York City accelerated the zoning
movement with what many legal scholars consider the first
comprehensive and systematic zoning law.30 The New York
City law articulated a planned urban landscape with a
comprehensive resolution “regulating and limiting the height
and bulk of buildings[,] . . . regulating and determining the area of
yards, . . . and regulating and restricting the location of trades
and industries.”31 The law established use districts consisting of
“(1) residence districts, (2) business districts, and (3) unrestricted
districts.”32 Additionally, the City created the Board of Appeals,
which, among other powers, was entrusted with the ability to
permit the expansion of existing buildings and the erection of
telephone exchanges, garages, and public stables.33
The 1916 law sought to ameliorate many of the negative
effects of urban growth. For instance, the Equitable Building, one
of Manhattan’s iconic early twentieth-century buildings, rose 42
stories directly flush with the street.34 Buildings without today’s
statutorily required “setbacks” created “canyons” that prevented
light and air from reaching the denizens below.35 The 1916 law
demanded setbacks at various heights, creating a “‘wedding cake’
configuration” that would provide more light and air to the
28 Id. at 385.
29 Kosman, supra note 20, at 80 (quoting Lawrence Veiller).
30 Lees, supra note 26, at 372.
31 N.Y.C., BUILDING ZONEORDINANCE §§ 2, 8, 10 (1916).
32 Id. § 2.
33 See id. § 7.
34 Stuart Beckerman, Zoning in New York City: An Overview, [Jan.-Feb.] 6
N.Y. Zoning L. and Prac. Rep. 4 (2006).
35 Id.
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streetscape.36 It also calculated height restrictions for buildings
relative to the width of nearby streets.37 Legislators carved an
exception into the law, the “tower privilege,” whereby towers were
permitted if they had large setbacks and the tall portion of the
building occupied less than 25% of the lot.38 These exceptions to the
otherwise strict limits, foreshadowing the modern zoning rule and
variance system, essentially dictated the shapes of many buildings
built after the adoption of the 1916 law.39 But despite its asserted
de-densifying objectives, in practice, the 1916 law allowed for very
dense and tall development, such as the Empire State Building.40
While early court decisions and the 1916 law set the stage
for the twentieth-century urban planning paradigm, modern
zoning lacked the full embrace of a Supreme Court decision. The
Court’s silence allowed further development of comprehensive
zoning codes (and further confusion in state courts) for nearly a
decade before it formally authorized modern zoning in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.41 The village council in Euclid, Ohio,
adopted a “comprehensive zoning plan” that sought to separate
land uses by neighborhood, provide for the number of dwellings
within a housing structure, and specify the permissible location for
certain trades.42 The appellant landowner sought a repudiation of
the law, which prevented Ambler Realty from developing industrial
space on the land it owned in a residential district.43
The appellant argued that the ordinance impermissibly
restricted it from otherwise lawful uses of its land.44 The Court
noted that, while such regulations might have been rejected in
years past as “arbitrary and oppressive,” zoning rules were
appropriate “under the complex conditions of [the] day,” and the
new zoning regulations were analogous to traffic signals.45 The
Court determined that, if a zoning law is debatably reasonable,
the “legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”46 By
upholding the comprehensive zoning plan, the Court ushered in
36 Id.
37 N.Y.C., BUILDING ZONEORDINANCE § 8 (1916).
38 Id. § 9; see also Norman Williams, Jr. & John M. Taylor, The First Period—
The New York Law, 1 Am. Land Plan. L. § 36.8 (2015).
39 CAROL WILLIS, FORM FOLLOWS FINANCE: SKYSCRAPERS AND SKYLINES IN
NEW YORK AND CHICAGO 72-73 (1995).
40 Williams & Taylor, supra note 38.
41 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Lees, supra note
26, at 372-73.
42 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379-80.
43 Id. at 365, 382.
44 Id. at 384.
45 Id. at 387.
46 Id. at 388.
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nearly a century of municipal land use regulation where zoning
law promulgators would have broad license to encourage certain
development, discourage incompatible uses, and limit disfavored
uses to narrow sectors of the community.
In New York City, the 1916 zoning law developed through
two wars, economic ruin, and subsequent economic growth. As a
result, the law became a tattered “patchwork” with numerous
amendments.47 In 1961, the city adopted a new comprehensive
zoning plan48 that sought to clear urban slums and develop clean,
new neighborhoods with greater open space and parking.49 This
new plan preferred oversized lots with large structures.50
This progression towards large-scale urban renewal was
not without its critics. The same year the city adopted a new
comprehensive zoning plan, Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of
Great American Cities was published.51 Jacobs unflinchingly
stated that her book was “an attack on current city planning and
rebuilding.”52 Through a New York–centric urban lens, she
lamented that her planning contemporaries “have ignored the
study of success and failure [of cities] in real life, have been
incurious about the reasons for unexpected success, and are
guided instead by principles derived from the behavior and
appearance of towns, suburbs, tuberculosis sanatoria, fairs, and
imaginary dream cities—from anything but cities themselves.”53
After the loss of New York City’s Penn Station to redevelopment,
preservation-minded citizens like Jane Jacobs demanded and
successfully created the Landmarks Preservation Commission.54
Since that time, the zoning code and the landmarks law have
conflicted in purpose and application.55
New York City’s constantly evolving economic condition
necessitated more small changes to the zoning map. It was the
practice in many circumstances to require so-called “inclusionary
zoning,” where developers would be required to provide
community benefits in exchange for a rezoning.56 Though the
Supreme Court has required that in order to be constitutional,
47 Norman Marcus, New York City Zoning—1961–1991: Turning Back the
Clock—But With an Up-To-The-Minute Social Agenda, 19 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 707 (1992).
48 N.Y.C., ZONING RESOLUTION § 72 (1961).
49 Marcus, supra note 47, at 708.
50 Id. at 709.
51 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (Vintage
Books 1992) (1961).
52 Id. at 3.
53 See id. at 6.
54 Marcus, supra note 47, at 709.
55 Id. at 710.
56 Id. at 720.
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these “exactions”57 must have a “rational nexus” to the community
need created by the new development,58 this quid pro quo
exchange has continued nationwide.59 Ultimately, as the next part
will demonstrate, this system of comprehensive zoning that
demands low density development, landmark protections, and
inclusionary community benefits has been responsible for wildly
expensive housing that fails to balance the needs of neighborhood
residents, landowners, and the broader public.
II. ZONING’S LIMITING EFFECT ON AFFORDABLEHOUSING
Despite the supposed positive effects of modern zoning on
the American city, zoning can limit an urban neighborhood’s ability
to thrive economically, environmentally, and politically. Although a
broad understanding among urban planners that “New Urbanism”
provides a strong alternative to sprawling, car-centric suburbs,60
the suburb-centric thinking of Jane Jacobs’s contemporaries has
remained. Through the frame of affordable housing, it is possible to
see zoning’s effect on one neighborhood in particular: the East New
York neighborhood in Brooklyn. This neighborhood provides a
strong example of the dangers of restrictive zoning and the
opportunities that a public interest variance might create.
East New York developed in the nineteenth century as a
mix of industrial and residential uses, spurred on by access to the
Long Island Railroad and elevated transit lines on Fulton Street
(which would later become portions of the New York City
subway).61 Its population peaked in the mid-twentieth-century
postwar period, but then the neighborhood experienced divestment
and a loss of nearly one-third of its residents.62 After a long period
during which the area looked “worse than London did after the
blitz,” investors have recently reentered the neighborhood, seeking
57 Exactions are the aforementioned community benefits a developer provides
to secure a rezoning for a particular land use. See, e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water
Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013).
58 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
59 For a recent example of the “rational nexus” problem, see Koontz, 133 S.
Ct. at 2599 (holding that “monetary exactions”—payments in lieu of a grant to the
government of land or services—must be related by satisfying “nexus” and “rough
proportionality” requirements).
60 Timothy Polmateer, How Localism’s Rationales Limit New Urbanism’s Success
and What New Regionalism Can Do About It, 41 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1085, 1095 (2014).
61 N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF CITY PLANNING, EAST NEW YORK COMMUNITY PLAN 5 (2015),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/east_new_york/presentation_092015.pdf?r=1 [http://perma
.cc/PGB2-TLHF].
62 See id. at 7.
846 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:2
to ride the “wave” of economic upheaval that many in the academic
community and the public at-large describe as “gentrification.”63
Despite the opportunity that increased investment presents
to this neighborhood through additional retail, educational, and
cultural institutions, zoning limitations cast a pall on those who
would modernize and renovate a neighborhood that is ideally
suited to tackle the housing crisis. Zoning regulations in East New
York prevent much large-scale residential redevelopment, despite
the abundance of transit options that pervade the neighborhood
and connect it to employment centers.64 In large part, the
neighborhood is zoned “low-density residential” (what the zoning
code calls “R5”).65 This low-density provision undermines the
growth of affordable housing in this neighborhood, which in turn
isolates the public transportation in New York from a great
majority of citizens who might otherwise utilize it.
Zoning regulations also establish minimum parking
requirements, which make development more expensive by
demanding that developers build parking spots along with
housing.66 This creates housing that is unnecessarily expensive
due to the cost of allocating and developing parking space.
Further, Atlantic Avenue, one of Brooklyn’s largest traffic
corridors, is zoned light industrial (M1-1) and low-density
commercial (C8-2) in East New York.67 Residential uses are not
allowed on that street, despite the neighborhood’s desire for “more
diverse housing options so [that] young people can move back to
the neighborhood when they become successful.”68
New York City’s zoning regulations also limit East New
York’s ability to achieve positive economic and social change.
Present regulations prevent the development of high-density,
modern residential units.69 The zoning regulations require front
yards and on-site parking and encourage front-of-the-parcel
vehicle access that discourages pedestrian activity.70 In addition,
63 Andrew Rice, The Red Hot Rubble of East New York, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 28,
2015, 6:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/01/east-new-york-gentrification.
html [http://perma.cc/WY8B-TUJM] (quoting Alfred Kazin).
64 N.Y.C. DEP’T. OFCITY PLANNING, HOUSINGNEWYORK: A FIVE-BOROUGH, TEN-
YEAR PLAN (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/housing/assets/downloads/pdf/housing_plan.pdf
[http://perma.cc/92CA-K8TV].
65 N.Y.C. DEP’T. OF CITY PLANNING, EAST NEW YORK AND CYPRESS HILLS
SUBAREA 34 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/sustainable_communities/east_ny_
report/east_ny_cypress_hills_subarea.pdf [http://perma.cc/3LKX-P5JD].
66 Id. at 40.
67 Id. at 34.
68 Id. at 34, 39.
69 Id. at 40.
70 Id.
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there are numerous empty parcels in the areas zoned “industrial”
and “commercial,” discouraging mixed-use development by
making walking unpleasant.71 This harmful zoning creates
derelict lots that could otherwise improve the neighborhood’s
quality of life and serve the public’s need for affordable housing.
This mismatch between the zoning laws on the books and
the land use objectives of citizens and property owners might lead
policy engineers to believe that zoning simply cannot work. Critics
argue that zoning mandates inefficient land uses that limit the
freedom of landowners and distort market forces.72 While this
argument contains some truth, zoning’s opponents cannot
champion freedom and market forces without balancing the other
important quality-of-life factors that zoning regulations protect.
Many commentators cite the city of Houston, Texas, which has no
zoning code, as an example of how a city can function without a
highly regulated land use regime.73 But cities like Houston have
far greater carbon emissions per capita than more densely
populated, public transit–oriented and pedestrian friendly cities.74
Among other factors, Houston’s car-dependent commutes that
reduce pedestrian options encouraged one publication to crown
Houston the “Fattest City” in America.75 While researchers have
determined that restrictive zoning regimes have caused overly
expensive housing in New York City,76 commentators have argued
that Houston’s quality of life (a vague metric, to be sure) is heading
in the wrong direction precisely due to problems regarding growth
and sprawl.77
71 Id.
72 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, 10 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L. 45, 61 (1994).
73 Id. at 45.
74 Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew E. Kahn, The Greenness of Cities: Carbon
Dioxide Emissions and Urban Development (NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, Working
Paper 14238, 2008), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/cent
ers-programs/centers/taubman/working_papers/glaeser_08_greencities.pdf [http://perma.cc/
K9JZ-CN4Q] (noting that “the social cost of a new home in Houston is $550 more per
year than the social cost of a new home in San Francisco”).
75 Nate Millado & Sara Vigneri, The Fittest and Fattest Cities in America,
MEN’S FITNESS, http://www.mensfitness.com/weight-loss/burn-fat-fast/the-fittest-and-
fattest-cities-in-america [http://perma.cc/JA9J-BAM4] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
76 Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Zoning on Housing
Affordability 21 (HARVARD INST. OF ECON. RESEARCH, Discussion Paper No. 1948, 2002),
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/hier1948.pdf [http://perma.cc/52RJ-5W73].
77 Clifford Pugh, No Laughing Matter: Houston Trending in Wrong Direction
with Quality of Life Eroding, Report Says, CULTUREMAP HOUSTON (Feb. 27, 2013, 3:28
PM), http://houston.culturemap.com/news/city-life/02-27-13-no-laughing-matter-houston-
trending-in-wrong-direction-with-quality-of-life-eroding-survey-says/ [http://perma.cc/4D
87-88YN].
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Ultimately, arguments against zoning stand as a reaction
to the modern regulatory state more than they propose plausible
alternatives that would improve the health, welfare, and
economic fortune of urban dwellers. Zoning has a long and
legitimate history, and an attempt to solve the housing
affordability crisis by deleting zoning from the urban planning
toolkit seems unduly radical. Reformers should pursue relatively
minor changes in urban land use law that maintain the quality-
of-life elements of zoning but incorporate some of the less
restrictive development rules of cities like Houston to achieve
the “best of both worlds.”
A dearth of affordable housing is not the only effect of an
overly dictatorial zoning regime. The American city, whether one
considers New York City or Houston, has pursued car-centric
zoning models that infringe upon individual autonomy by
requiring residents to purchase automobiles and frequent
highways to simply have access to employment.78 Reimagining
the variance not only promises more affordable housing for
urbanites, but also promotes foundational American values by
granting landowners the liberty to utilize their land as they so
desire and granting the public more effective, yet noninvasive,
electoral control over that increased liberty.
Though many commentators and citizens have accepted
the constitutionality and utility of modern urban zoning,
numerous legal writers have found that the present urban land
use regulations inhibit economic growth and social progress.79
Even cities without zoning schemes still have building codes and
regulations that limit, among other activities, high-density
development.80 The critiques of such cities appear to center on
overregulation in general, rather than on concerns with zoning
specifically. These critiques, typically in the libertarian vein,
provide inadequate solutions to the problems associated with land
use regulation because they tend to suggest that market forces
78 See generally supra Part I.
79 See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Invisible Businessman: Undermining Black
Enterprise with Land Use Rules, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2009) (noting “[l]and
use fees, municipal zoning board decisions, and the general insistence on separating
residential from commercial uses all impress unique and disproportionate harms on
African-American merchants, making it difficult to find affordable business space in
suitable locations”); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1675 (2012)
(reporting that “[s]trict zoning rules in productive regions not only cause static efficiency
losses but can also reduce economic growth. Artificially high housing prices limit
employment in . . . fast-growing industries . . . , and they reduce the number of people
who can capture the human-capital-enhancing information spillovers”).
80 Michael Lewyn, How Overregulation Creates Sprawl (Even in a City
Without Zoning), 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1171, 1178-81 (2004).
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will foster ideal urban development patterns. But the similarities
that libertarian zoning critiques share with urban progressive
critiques highlight the public interest variance’s potential to
resolve modern debates surrounding land use regulation.
The libertarian case against the present land use
paradigm in New York City is a predictable one. If a developer
wishes to develop property in a manner even somewhat
inconsistent with city regulations, the developer must traverse a
complex structure of boards and regulatory units for permission.
When an amendment or zoning change is proposed, the issue is
first heard by one of the city’s 59 community boards, which will
issue a nonbinding recommendation.81 The borough president
then issues a recommendation and sends the proposal to the City
Planning Commission.82 The City Planning Commission and the
City Council vote on the proposal, which, in order to be approved,
must be signed by the Mayor or recertified by two-thirds of the
City Council upon the Mayor’s veto.83 The entire process takes
eight months, on average.84 In some cases, developers must include
environmental impact statements, which greatly increases the cost
of the proposal.85
These restrictions simply fan the flame of conservative
resentment towards the power of land use regulations. Euclid
may have authorized zoning, but the present zoning structure
does more. Not only does New York City’s approach limit the
freedom to use land as a landowner sees fit—it requires that an
interested party seek the approval of nearly every stakeholder
who could ostensibly have an opinion on land use policy before
development is permitted. Most concerning is the requirement of
the borough president’s recommendation. The borough president
is an elected official with mostly ceremonial powers, and as such
has no real relation to zoning policy. Further, the borough
president is not likely to have the expertise necessary to sufficiently
address zoning questions. The present structure merely provides
opportunities for interested individuals to exercise political
influence over land use, rather than a rational process that protects
the rights of citizens to petition their government and promotes the
public’s interest in urban development.
81 Schleicher, supra note 79, at 1706 (reciting the procedures set forth in
N.Y.C. Law § 197-c).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1706-07.
84 Id. at 1707.
85 Id.
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The state of urban land use rights is equally imperiled in
places without zoning or with abrogated zoning regulations. The
test case for “free-market” approaches to land use, Houston, is
illusory, as even Houston maintains certain restrictions over
development.86 Houston’s code requires a minimum lot size,87
minimum parking allotments,88 broad streets (which severely
limit pedestrians),89 and long blocks.90 In addition, by contract,
Houston subdivisions create restrictive covenants that emulate the
use restrictions of cities with zoning maps.91 Ultimately, libertarian
critiques should be equally suspicious of private land use controls,
such as those seen in Houston, as they are of comprehensive zoning
regimes, as both create extreme limitations on individuals’
practical power to utilize their property as they desire.
In a country where even those cities most known for
permissive land use enforce strict regulatory rules that limit a
landowner’s right to use her land, how can property owners serve
the public interest through development? Perhaps cities92 could
better serve broad interests through an expansive vision of
equitable municipal land use review. Libertarians could find
strange but willing bedfellows in politically progressive affordable
housing activists if they recognized the legitimacy of the land use
regulatory state but then proceeded to argue for its abrogation
through something like a permissive variance system.
III. THE VARIANCE: MITIGATING “HARDSHIP”
New York City’s present zoning law provides a single,
clear avenue for redress when zoning regulations prove overly
burdensome for the landowner: the variance. Section 72-21 of
the Zoning Resolution empowers the Board of Standards and
Appeals (Board) to grant relief from the zoning code through a
variance.93 In order to do so, the Board must make “each and
every one” of the following findings:
(a) that there are unique physical conditions, including irregularity . . . or
other physical conditions . . . and that, as a result . . . unnecessary
86 Lewyn, supra note 80, at 1178.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 1183.
89 Id. at 1186-87.
90 Id. at 1189.
91 Id. at 1190.
92 This revised variance would likely only be available in cities with actual
zoning regimes, meaning that cities like Houston may have to fashion other solutions
to the problems outlined in this note.
93 N.Y.C., ZONING RESOLUTION § 72-21 (1961).
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hardship arise[s] in complying strictly . . . and that the alleged practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardship are not due to circumstances created
generally by the strict application of such provisions . . . ;
(b) that because of such physical conditions there is no reasonable
possibility that a development . . . will bring a reasonable return,
and that the grant of a variance is therefore necessary to enable the
owner to realize a reasonable return . . . ;
(c) that the variance . . . will not alter the essential character of the
neighborhood . . . ;
(d) that the [difficulties or hardship] . . . have not been created by the
owner . . . ; and
(e) that . . . the variance, if granted, is the minimum variance
necessary to afford relief . . . .94
Despite the rigorous demands of 72-21, courts review the
Board’s variance decision with a light touch; only those
determinations with something approximating “illegality,
arbitrariness or abuse of discretion” without “a rational basis” or
“substantial evidence” will be overturned.95 The Board may rely on
the findings of the City Planning Commission,96 testimony from
experts hired by property owners,97 and, specifically, property data
from outside the neighborhood to calculate possible rates of return
that an investment by the property owner might hope to earn.98
Expert testimony, though helpful, is not required, and the Board
must not rule based on “generalized community objections.”99
The present conception of the variance heavily depends on
a judgment call about what does or does not “alter the essential
character of the neighborhood.”100 One might conceive of an
alteration either as (1) a negative change to a neighborhood, or (2)
any change to a neighborhood. For example, would an old
schoolhouse, converted to a home for the elderly,101 present a
change under the standard? Due to the likely decrease in traffic
volume in the area from converting the structure from a school to
a home for the elderly, the court in Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin
found there to be no change to the neighborhood under those
94 Id.
95 SoHo Alliance v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Standards and Appeals, 741 N.E.2d 106, 107-
08 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105, 109 (1978)).
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Ifrah v. Utschig, 774 N.E.2d 732, 734 (N.Y. 2002).
100 N.Y.C., ZONING RESOLUTION § 72-21(c)(1961).
101 Commco, Inc. v. Amelkin, 109 A.D.2d 794, 796 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
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facts.102 In general, courts appear to reject variances when
commercial changes are likely to overwhelm an existing
residential area but are amenable to proposals that introduce
diverse uses without aggressive changes to neighborhood
character.103 These outcomes show that the variance is not really
based on “economic hardship” but rather, boards grant variances
based on the holistic views of the proposed development that they
and participating community members hold.
IV. REIMAGINING THE VARIANCE
Urban areas currently face challenges that threaten to
undo decades of advances in living standards. Previously, due to
the influences of complex regulatory processes, NIMBYism,104 and
statutory limitations, urban land use law had been unable to
adequately address the housing affordability crisis. But even
those cities like Houston that lack zoning regimes have had
negative quality-of-life effects related to zoning-free development.105
For that reason, a flexible solution that rewards socially beneficial
development is needed. Using standards and case law outlined in
the 1996 Telecommunications Act106 and Pennsylvania’s “Curative
Amendment,”107 state legislatures and municipalities can reinvent
the variance process so that instead of an “economic hardship”
standard, variances will be judged with precision by the way they
impact housing availability, traffic, air quality, or other direct
legislative objectives as stated in the statute. By reimagining the
variance as a tool for achieving civic ends, rather than a narrowly
102 Id.; see also Rostlee Assocs., Ltd. v. Amelkin, 121 A.D.2d 725, 726 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986) (distinguishing Commco but implicitly accepting its general premise
that a neighborhood is not “essentially” altered by a positive change along the lines of
vehicular traffic decline).
103 See Taxpayers’ Ass’n of S. E. Oceanside v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Town of
Hempstead, 93 N.E.2d 645, 646-47 (N.Y. 1950) (finding “use of the property as a site for a
boathouse and dock to test motorboats up and down the creek and the plan to provide
parking facilities for thirty to forty automobiles will create conditions distinctly different
from those existing in the locality and thus will unquestionably alter the essential
character of an otherwise residential neighborhood”); Fiore v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of
Town of Southeast, 235 N.E.2d 121, 122-23 (N.Y. 1968) (noting that a barn’s conversion to
an antiques business’s storage facility could not have altered the community because the
community failed to notice or complain about the change for five years).
104 An acronym for “not in my backyard,” and a reference to individuals who
oppose development near their homes and workplaces. See Christopher Helman, Nimby
Nation: The High Cost to America of Saying No to Everything, FORBES (July 30, 2015,
6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2015/07/30/nimby-nation-the-
high-cost-to-america-of-saying-no-to-everything/ [http://perma.cc/Y2JR-56QR].
105 See supra Part II for a discussion of the difficulties of unzoned development.
106 Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 332, 609 (2012).
107 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10609.1 (2002).
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tailored relief tool, landowners with projects that serve the public
interest can overcome self-interested political mechanisms to
better serve a municipality’s most urgent needs and further
improve the quality of life in American cities.
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
As a general matter, the federal government has avoided
regulating private land use, deferring to state and local
governments in accordance with broadly accepted principals of
federalism.108 A notable exception is the Telecommunications Act
of 1996,109 which, among many other functions, prescribes the
delicate balance between local land use regulators and
telecommunications companies seeking to build wireless
communications towers.110 Though the statute acknowledges the
plenary power of state and local governments to regulate the
telecommunications business,111 the statute also provides that
(i) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of
personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government
or instrumentality thereof—
(I) shall not unreasonably discriminate among providers of
functionally equivalent services; and
(II) shall not prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
provision of personal wireless services.112
The law reflects the notion that, though states and their
subdivisions may regulate land use, states cannot establish
regimes whereby otherwise legal activities are made de facto
illegal by limiting the locations where the activity may occur. In
other words, the law suggests that boards should grant planning
variances based on the public’s need—in the case of the
Telecommunications Act—for wireless services. The variance could
undoubtedly be refashioned to reflect this notion that an otherwise
legal development cannot be unreasonably excluded from the
community simply because of the zoning rules. And in the process,
108 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 57
(1997) (noting that “[a]lthough Congress flirted briefly with proposals to establish a
National Land Use Act in the 1970s, the federal government has, for the most part, avoided
direct intervention in land use regulation, viewing it as properly a state and local affair”).
109 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 332.
110 Id. § 332(c)(7).
111 Id. § 332(c)(7)(A).
112 Id. § 332(c)(7)(B).
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the variance could ensure that landowners are able to use land in
ways that are both lawful and to the benefit of the public.
B. The Pennsylvania “Curative” Amendment
Pennsylvania, sensing the ever-challenging conflict
between individual liberty and the value of land use regulation,
expanded the equitable power of broad variance-style review.
Pennsylvania’s Curative Amendment law113 provides a process
through which a landowner may “challenge on substantive
grounds the validity of a zoning ordinance or map or any
provision thereof, which prohibits or restricts the use or
development of land in which he has an interest.” The
landowner “may submit a curative amendment to the
governing body with a written request that his challenge and
proposed amendment be heard and decided.”114 The
municipality must then hold a hearing, after which the
government may accept the proposed amendment, adopt a
variation of the proposal, or refuse the request on its merits.115
The municipality’s determination must rest on
(1) the impact of the proposal upon roads, sewer facilities, water
supplies, schools and other public service facilities;
(2) if the proposal is for a residential use, the impact of the proposal
upon regional housing needs and the effectiveness of the proposal in
providing housing units of a type actually available to and affordable
by classes of persons otherwise unlawfully excluded by the
challenged provisions of the ordinance or map;
(3) the suitability of the site for the intensity of use proposed by the
site’s soils, slopes, woodland, wetlands, flood plains, aquifers,
natural resources and other natural features;
(4) the impact of the proposed use on the site’s soils, slopes, woodlands,
wetlands, flood plans, natural resources and natural features, the
degree to which these are protected or destroyed, the tolerance of the
resources to development and any adverse environmental impacts; and
(5) the impact of the proposal on the preservation of agriculture and
other land uses which are essential to public health and welfare.116
This regime acknowledges the principle that a municipality must
accept its “fair share” of development that will necessarily occur
113 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10609.1 (2002).
114 Id. § 10609.1(a).
115 Id. § 10609.1(a)-(c).
116 Id. § 10609.1(c).
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within a larger urban area.117 In Pennsylvania, courts
acknowledge that citizens collectively have a right to housing
proportionate “to the extent of the municipality’s fair share of the
present and prospective regional need.”118 By adopting this
position, the legislature and courts of Pennsylvania have
embraced the principle that a landowner should be able to do
more than sue for relief from an economically burdensome zoning
law. The landowner should be freed from the harshness of the law
when public policy warrants abrogation. Pennsylvania’s Curative
Amendment, while an admirable attempt to incorporate equitable
values into land use law, lacks a clear method for balancing the
competing interests it identifies. For example, whether the
infrastructure factor (subsection (1)) or the agricultural factor
(subsection (5)) should predominate over the other factors seems
entirely dependent on the subjective preferences of the reviewer.
This method fails to overcome the arbitrary nature of the variance
that is common to the bulk of variance reform schemes.
C. The Proposed “Balancing” Test
A third strain of zoning reform involves reinventing the
variance through a test that balances the burdens on the
landowner that exist without the variance and the burdens on
the community if the variance is granted. The Supreme Court
of Connecticut at one point applied this test,119 but it contains
many of the same problems that plague the Pennsylvania
Curative Amendment.
To illustrate how the balancing test would work, consider
a piece of property zoned for single-family residential use upon
which a landowner wishes to build somewhat dense multifamily
units. Under the balancing test, zoning boards would have
discretion to grant the variance “if the limited ‘alternatives
available to the landowner’ and the ‘diminution of the value of
the land’ outweigh the ‘degree of public harm to be
prevented.’”120 Here, the board would consider, among many
factors, the type of neighboring land use, the receptiveness of
117 Krystle L. Jackson, Need for Reform: The Pennsylvania “Curative
Amendment” in Light of the National Housing Crisis, 18 WIDENER L.J. 937, 956 (2009).
118 Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Upper Providence Twp., 382 A.2d 105,
109 (Pa. 1977) (adopting and quoting S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount
Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)).
119 Ann Martindale, Replacing the Hardship Doctrine: A Workable, Equitable
Test for Zoning Variances, 20 CONN. L. REV. 669, 713-14 (1988) (citing Chevron Oil Co.
v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelton, 365 A.2d 387, 391 (Conn. 1976)).
120 Id. at 714 (quoting Chevron Oil Co., 365 A.2d at 391).
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neighboring landowners to the variance, the importance of the
project to the community’s economic, cultural, and health
climates, the degree of difference between the profitability of the
land use with or without the variance, and the costs to the
government, both directly and indirectly, from the variance.121
In this example, if the land is near the edge of a suburban
community, the analysis would likely weigh in favor of adopting
the variance. Increased multifamily housing would be unlikely to
negatively affect neighboring land use, as owners of undeveloped
nearby property would likely appreciate the increased value that
neighboring development would bring to their property. The
apartments would provide (relatively) affordable housing in a new
neighborhood without the existing structural de-investment seen in
other affordable housing proposals.122 In addition, the difference in
economic value for the landowner between developing single-family
and multifamily homes would be extreme, as increased density
would inevitably lead to more housing value per square foot of
land. As such, the variance would likely succeed.
But the flexibility of this method brings to the forefront its
weakness: arbitrariness. Boards are likely to bring unique
opinions about land use to their variance-evaluation duties. Those
tasked with balancing competing interests would have little
guidance in a system where, to an extent, a zero-sum game exists.
If neighboring landowners fight against a project, the balance of
their interests would likely come down to political power and their
ability to organize. In this circumstance, existing communities
with more wealth would be able to create legal funds and political
action groups and provide consistent firepower at community
meetings. Under the balancing test, boards would be more subject
to the political winds than they would under a more explicit
variance rule, as the limited flexibility associated with a more
explicit rule would restrict a board to the explicit thresholds
within the applicable statute.
In New York City, permissible land use has been limited for
the neighborhood of Park Slope, Brooklyn. Park Slope, historically
a middle class, left-leaning community surrounded by lower-
income neighborhoods, has been transformed by gentrification and
its associated “community fussbudgets, whiny parents, taverns
crawling with toddlers, [and] hip watering holes edging out old-
121 Id. at 720-21.
122 See supra Part II (discussing East New York’s struggles with de-
investment and complaints phrased in “gentrification” terms).
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man bars.”123 Despite the negative reactions to these changes,
housing values in Park Slope continue to skyrocket.124 With such
increasing value, logical markets would dictate increasing housing
development to most effectively capture the neighborhood rise. In
2003, however, the Department of Buildings rezoned large swaths
of Park Slope, limiting building height to five stories and
permitting only minor increases along commercial avenues.125
Conversely, on the edge of Park Slope is Fourth Avenue, an
arterial street once blanketed with automotive repair shops.126 The
Department of Buildings also rezoned Fourth Avenue in 2003, but
rather than restricting development, it rezoned the area to permit
buildings up to 12 stories tall with setbacks.127 Since that time, the
area has developed into a mixed-use neighborhood with higher
density apartment buildings, cafes, and restaurants.128
However beneficial housing, cafes, and restaurants can
be, observers might question how exactly some areas of Park
Slope were “downzoned”129 while others were “upzoned”130 in
ways that led to drastic changes. Some commentators, debating
the relative merits of changes in nearby neighborhoods, have
even gone further to argue that “the rich upper Slope sold the
lower Slope down the river by asking for downzoning.”131
Whether land use theorists should believe that assertion is, for
purposes of this note, irrelevant. Ultimately, the Park Slope
rezoning illustrates the dangers of a balancing system: the
political process and balancing interests inevitably create losers,
123 Lynn Harris, Park Slope: Where is the Love, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/18/fashion/18slope.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/A7EE-6JKH].
124 For example, the home of New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, located in
southern Park Slope, doubled in worth from $674,600 to $1.4 million in seven years.
Carl Campanile, De Blasio’s Property Value Rises Under Bloomberg, N.Y. POST (Jan.
17, 2014, 3:57 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/01/17/de-blasios-property-value-rises-under-
bloomberg/ [http://perma.cc/Q5TV-QM6K].
125 Sarah Laskow, The Quiet, Massive Rezoning of New York, POLITICO N.Y.
(Feb. 24, 2014, 11:10 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/2014/02/
8540743/quiet-massive-rezoning-new-york?page=all [http://perma.cc/6XSA-UBT3].
126 Special 4th Avenue Enhanced Commercial District—Approved!, N.Y.C. DEP’T.
OF CITY PLANNING, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/fourth/fourth2.shtml [http://perma.cc/
QF5M-T3TA] (last visited Mar. 2, 2016).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Downzoning refers to a change in zoning in which density is restricted.
Richard W. Bartke & John S. Lamb, Upzoning, Public Policy, and Fairness—A Study
and Proposal, 17 WM. &MARY L. REV. 701, 702 n.10 (1976).
130 Upzoning refers to a change in zoning in which density is more fully
permitted. Id.
131 Clarkson FlatBed, Are We Being Sold a Bill of Goods? Or Not?, THE Q AT
PARKSIDE (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:04 PM), http://theqatparkside.blogspot.com/2014/09/are-we-
being-sold-bill-of-goods.html [http://perma.cc/KZF3-C2QB].
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and those losers are likely to be less politically connected or
organized. In this case, it appears that wealthy homeowners
pushed rezoning to other neighborhoods so they could protect
their own quality of life, exclude future renters, and outsource
the challenges that come with increased development (such as
strains on school capacity and increased traffic). Therefore, the
variance must be reinvented to incorporate the balancing test’s
flexibility while also ensuring that the interests of the entire
public, and not just a select few, are achieved.
D. Crafting a Compromise for the Public Interest
The variance, though still nominally tied to “economic
hardship,”132 has been used to favor developments that the
politically active public and zoning boards themselves support
to the detriment of developments that, while within the letter
of the variance law, are politically unpopular.133 The 1996
Telecommunications Act suggested that variances must be
available when zoning law prevents a particular type of
necessary telecommunications development. Pennsylvania law
demonstrates that the “Curative Amendment,” a variance-like
device, can provide relief when the exception positively affects,
among other factors, “housing units of a type actually available
to and affordable by classes of persons otherwise unlawfully
excluded.”134 Finally, the so-called “balancing test” provides an
opportunity to determine the relative needs of the landowner
and the community at large to reach an equitable solution.
Though each variance method discussed has unique
advantages, the drawbacks of each method point to a better
method that is focused on the potential benefit to the public. The
Telecommunications Act lacks teeth; it specifically provides that
“nothing in this chapter shall limit or affect the authority of a
State or local government or instrumentality thereof over
decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification
of personal wireless service facilities.”135 This premise, as applied to
housing policy, suggests that a statute can require municipalities
to provide enough zoned density to facilitate affordable housing,
132 Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning
and Land-Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 339
(1995) (noting “[t]he most common standard, derived from the language of many
ordinances, allows an area variance to be granted upon a showing of ‘practical
difficulties or unnecessary hardship’”).
133 See supra Part III.
134 Jackson, supra note 117, at 948.
135 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2012).
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but such a requirement could leave a state with no recourse for
unreasonable exclusion by the municipality other than
commandeering the municipal zoning board and taking control of
the city’s development. Put another way, a statute that demands
that a municipality must pursue affordable housing will fail,
because it does not create a procedure that might realistically
bring that goal into reality. A more property-right driven law that
allows citizens to engage the government and address the
suitability of a parcel for development would actually achieve the
public ends, rather than just stating them in broad terms.
The Pennsylvania Curative Amendment, though very
close in function to a public interest–driven variance, is overly
broad and insufficiently specific in its requirements. The
provision considers, among other items: roads, sewers, schools,
housing, land characteristics, agriculture, public health, and
welfare.136 While these issues are essential to any public interest–
driven variance structure, the statute fails to announce in
tangible terms exactly how a variance must benefit or affect the
public. An effective variance system must provide clear guidelines
for how large a benefit must be, either through a number of
housing units, a ratio of housing units, or a standard that
considers the landowners’ ability to deliver the benefit desired
(i.e., affordable housing).
Finally, the balancing test provides extreme flexibility
without any safeguards to avoid abuse. For an example of this,
one need only look to communities like Park Slope, where in
many cases migrants to the community overpower landowners
with less political or organizational clout. The ideal public interest
variance would allow a landowner to prevail over self-interested
neighborhood opposition when the public would benefit from the
variance to a degree that dwarfs unreasonable objections from
surrounding property owners. Only then would the variance be
flexible, yet fair.
E. A Statutory Model
Drawing on current models and principles, this note
proposes a model for how a public interest variance can be
structured, using both New York City’s variance law and its
municipal needs as a guide. Of course, land use regulation
solutions in various jurisdictions need not and should not be
identical. Thus it is surprising how long the “economic hardship”
136 53 PA. CONS. STAT § 10609.1(c) (2002).
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conception of variance rules has reigned across jurisdictions.
Under the proposed model, a state, and by extension, a
municipality, could incorporate its individual public policy into
the zoning code. Using the variance this way prevents the entire
zoning system from being merely a tool to favor a particular land
use. And under the proposed model, the general zoning law would
attempt to make various land uses compatible and would align a
city’s transportation, utility, economic, and social networks. This
model would also make the variance a tool for mitigating the
harshness of land use engineering and provide avenues for
landowners to gain personally from the beneficial development of
their property. With those principles in mind, New York City’s
variance law could read:
Where it is alleged that there are practical difficulties or unnecessary
hardship, the Board may grant a variance in the application . . . [when
the existing economic hardship doctrine applies]:
(f) or when:
(1) such a residential housing variance would provide
access to permanent affordable housing in proportion to
the residential impact that the same property would have
upon the community in its most developed state under
present law, it being the policy of the City of New York to
encourage the development of affordable housing; or
(2) such a residential housing variance would provide
convenient residential access to public transportation
and, it being the policy of the City of New York to pursue
ecologically friendly transportation options that
decrease traffic congestion and air pollution, encourage
such public transportation use by virtue of the property
being
(a) within 2,000 feet of a subway station, as
measured from the center of the most traveled
boarding platform, when such station includes
stops for both local and express train services, as
defined by the Metropolitan Transit Authority
(MTA), or
(b) within 1,000 feet of a subway station, as
measured from the center of the most traveled
boarding platform, when such station includes
stops for local train services, as defined by the
MTA, or
(c) within 500 feet of a New York City Transit
(NYCT) express bus stop with stops in boroughs
other than the borough in which the subject stop
exists, or
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(d) within 100 feet of a NYCT local bus stop; or
(3) such a residential housing variance would change the
land’s permitted uses only in so far as to remove the
requirements for off-street parking when such a
development provides access to permanent affordable
housing in one half (50%) proportion to the total number of
housing units on the parcel, it being the policy of the City
of New York to discourage automobile ownership.137
The specific numbers in the proposed law are merely an
example of the precise language that would govern the public
interest variance. As in Pennsylvania’s Curative Amendment,
references to infrastructure such as transit use and housing
development are useful to show legislative intent, but the
drafters must go further.138 Drafters must endeavor to state
exactly what quantifiable standards constitute a circumstance
deserving of amelioration. Whether the parcel must be within
1,000 feet of a transit station or 5,000 feet is irrelevant for this
model—those are simply sample numbers that show the
precision that drafters should seek. What is central is that the
public interest variance can be an equitable remedy based on
broad principles, but the provisions must be precise in order to
avoid the arbitrary outcomes of the above-mentioned balancing
tests. In that sense, the public interest variance may be better
thought of as “quasi-equitable.”
There are specific details that New York City would need
to add to legislation of the kind demonstrated in the proposed
law. For example, “affordable housing” would need to be defined.
Legislators would likely prefer to measure the affordability of a
housing unit by flexible means that take into consideration the
prevailing price of housing in a neighborhood, the relative income
of a neighborhood, and the cost of living in a municipality. For that
reason, legislators could tailor their affordable housing
definition to the construct developed for New York State Homes
and Community Renewal’s 80/20 Housing Program.139 In that
program, affordability is described as follows:
At least 20% of the units in the project must be affordable to
tenants earning no more than 50% of the Area Median Income [], or
40% of the units must be affordable to tenants earning no more than
137 N.Y.C., ZONING RESOLUTION § 72-21 (1961) (proposed additions in bold).
138 See supra Sections IV.B and IV.D for an explanation of how the
Pennsylvania Curative Amendment functions and its weaknesses.
139 See generally 80/20 Housing Program, NEW YORK STATE HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY RENEWAL (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.nyshcr.org/Topics/Developers/
MultifamilyDevelopment/8020HousingProgram.htm [http://perma.cc/F8BA-K6FF].
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60% of the Area Median Income, or, in New York City only, 25% of
the units to be affordable to tenants earning no more than 60% of the
Area Median Income.140
Ultimately, the specifics of how the statute calculates the
magnitude of the benefit are best left to legislators who understand
the unique needs of their cities, citizens, and developers.
CONCLUSION
It is a fact of democracy that legislative change requires
the organization and engagement of groups of people, often with
very different objectives, working to achieve significant changes in
public policy. To develop a public interest variance, groups with
different interests to protect would have to coalesce around the
various gains each group could likely expect from the new
variance system. However difficult coalition building may be, the
public interest variance contains incentives that diminish
opposition and facilitate cooperation.
The traditional variance battle between the landowner
and the neighbors presents numerous collective actions problems.
Though New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio has called for the
creation or preservation of 200,000 housing units within the five
boroughs,141 community groups have shown reluctance to embrace
development in their neighborhoods, claiming that affordable
housing projects “smell[ ] like gentrification.”142 As fears of
gentrification foster resistance to development, the present
system militates against affordable housing.
With the public interest variance, decisions about whether
an individual landowner should be permitted to build a larger
structure than the zoning law allows would be dictated by the
statutory variance provision, long before self-interested parties
seeking to prevent development voice their concerns. In effect, the
public’s expressed desire for affordable housing would be codified
to overpower the reluctance by local special interests to develop
140 LEONARD GRUENFELD, NEW YORK STATE HOMES AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL’S
80/20 HOUSING PROGRAM, http://www.nyshcr.org/assets/documents/8020TermSheet.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TV77-CKZ9].
141 Jennifer Fermino, Mayor de Blasio Unveils $41B Proposal to Develop
200,000 Units of Affordable Housing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 5, 2014, 1:36 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/mayor-unveils-41b-affordable-housing-plan-
article-1.1780018 [http://perma.cc/F78X-4FCT].
142 Residents Reject Plan to Enlarge Sunset Park Library with Affordable
Housing, BROWNSTONER (Nov. 5, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.brownstoner.com/blog/
2014/11/residents-reject-plan-to-enlarge-sunset-park-library-with-affordable-housing/
[http://perma.cc/DQ64-U5ND].
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affordable housing in specific neighborhoods. And while, upon
first glance, the plan might seem antidemocratic, it actually
fulfills the purpose of government more than the present system.
The government should balance interests and acknowledge that
the rights of the few must be occasionally abrogated by the needs
of the masses. Those who oppose development still have a voice in
the discussion, but that voice would be against the public interest
variance at the legislative level, rather than against a specific
proposal that benefits many but perhaps inconveniences the
opponent. And as an added protection, the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause would still apply, providing a limitation of
reasonableness over the entire system of land use regulation.
In Euclid, the Supreme Court noted that “while the
meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of
their application must expand or contract to meet the new and
different conditions which are constantly coming within the field
of their operation.”143 There are constitutional liberties at stake in
the public interest variance. By statute, the public, through its
legislators, could signal that it intends to divest itself of some
degree of power to oppose development projects that the public
broadly supports. As a result, property owners have a more
powerful right to use their property as they wish through a public
interest variance, and the landowner has an expanded property
right through the Fourteenth Amendment. The public interest
variance could ameliorate regulatory overreach in development,
increase personal freedoms, and support efforts by governments
and private citizens to increase the supply of affordable housing.
Such a change would benefit New York City residents like Dasani
by ensuring basic necessities of life are within reach for all New
York City families—even those with impossibly low incomes.
Policymakers must recognize the public desire for affordable
housing, rewrite the law to unlock the ingenuity of private
citizens, and ensure that New York City is a place where
upwardly mobile dreams can become reality.
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